Vain Pakistanis and their Imbecile Outbursts: The 1965 Indo-Pak War and its History

The vanity of the Pakistanis is stunning!  Two events have brought out the amazingly naive, childish and crazy “analysis” – rather imbecile banter really – from many Pakistani media personalities.  One is the 1965 War with India.

The other is the movie Phantom.  It has created its own industry of special imbecile hilarious attempts from vain Pakistanis to “feel good”.  We will address this one in a later post.  In this post we will deal with the more substantive of the issues – the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

Hysterical and Imbecile Pak Reaction to 1965

Before we start, let us take a look at one of the advertisements that was created in Pakistan to make them look good despite their history.

Here is another discussion that will help you understand the level of falsehoods spoken in full public view with utmost confidence.

The imbecility from the Pakistanis has been spewed in public due to a special event planned by the Indian Government to commemorate the bravery of the Indian Armed forces in the 1965 war.  The event is planned from August 28th to September 22nd this year.  It was on August 28th that India had captured the strategic Haji Pir pass.

Although it is said by the experts the world over that the war was “inconclusive” and not a “clear victory” for any side.  Yet, it has been acknowledged by all serious commentators that India had a clear upper hand when India went to the negotiating table.  Something that, in the view of complete wipe-out of all the gains by the Indian PM and his subsequent “assassination” points to a controversy that has never been really touched in India.  But it should be!

In “The Betrayal of Tashkent in 1965“, the author had discussed earlier, how decidedly bad and incorrect feedback from the Indian Army Chief led the Indian PM Lal Bahadur Shastri to negotiate with Pakistan when he shouldn’t have.  Jeremy Black a noted war historian also indicated in his book “War in the modern world since 1815”, that despite Pakistan having “lost heavily” during the 1965 war, India’s “hasty decision” to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces.

Despite this, when the Indian PM asked the Army Chief General J N Chaudhury, the General either misled the PM or was caught sleeping with no real idea of India’s position of strength! He told the PM that most of India’s frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. While the truth was that only 14% of India’s frontline ammunition had been used, while Pakistan’s 80% had been fired. Despite the fact that Pakistan entered with a superior tank strength going into the war, India (at the time of ceasefire had twice as many tanks still left). [Going into the war, Pakistan had 2 armoured divisions with as many as 675 Patton tanks, including others].
It was with THIS “intelligence” that the Indian PM negotiated with Pakistan’s Ayub Khan in Tashkent.

The reality is that India’s gains were decisive and the ammunition left on both sides indicated that if India had persisted for a few more weeks, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender conclusively!  Why?  Here are some facts that show why India’s decision to negotiate was wrong.

• India won 1,920 sqkm of territory; Pakistan won 540 sqkm
• 2,862 Indian soldiers were killed; Pakistan lost 5,800 soldiers
• India lost 97 tanks; 450 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or captured
• India captured the key Haji Pir pass – “a major ingress route for Pakistanis” – and made some big gains in Sialkot and reached the doors of Lahore in Punjab
• The Pakistani army managed to repulse a takeover of Lahore, made advances in the deserts of Rajasthan and came perilously close to taking over Akhnoor in the Jammu region.

Most importantly, the Indian Army had advanced so much inside the Pakistani territory that Lahore city was in their sight.  As William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek mention in their book “Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment”:

A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by the Indian Army.

As per a BBC report, three independent authors believe that India had an upper hand by the end of the war.

1. Retired American diplomat Dennis Kux: “Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan’s attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.”
2. English historian John Keay: “The war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India’s Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.”
3. American author Stanley Wolpert: “The war ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on US ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan’s capital of the Punjab when the ceasefire was called, and controlled Kashmir’s strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to [Pakistani president] Ayub’s chagrin.”

Let us look at other reports as well:

• The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy –on the Pakistani side, twenty aircrafts, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan’s army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country’s military defeat by “Hindu India” and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government (United States Library of Congress Country Studies)
• India held 690 Mi2 of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 Mi2 of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily…….Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N’. (TIME Magazine)

It is therefore clear that bad decision of the Indian political establishment notwithstanding – to go to Tashkent – India had but almost won the war.  And, would have made it formal, had a few more weeks been given to the Indian Defense forces.

Who started the War?

Like all wars from 1948 to Kargil, Pakistanis are wont to blame it on India.  The truth is that despite their “camouflaging” of their Army officers as “tribals”, their own commentators and officers have discussed how they led the initial invasions.  The truth of all such denials in 1948, 1965, and Kargil have eventually come out to the embarrassment of the Pakistani Army.

They are like the sociopath who cannot stop lying and won’t stop suicidal missions!

It was on August 5th 1965 that 26-33,000 Pakistani troops entered the Indian territory.  The Indian side was tipped off by the local populace and they hit back.  More importantly, India opened the war on many fronts, specially in Punjab and Rajasthan.

The impact of that was tremendous in terms of strategic maneuvers.

Pakistanis had entered the war with over 750 tanks, but lost 450 of them in the war and their coveted Patton tanks were an unmitigated failure!  Despite the fact that the fancied Patton tanks failed miserably, it takes a Pakistani media commentator to lie with a straight face to the world.

Flickers of hope in a cloud of nonsense

Some of the Pakistani commentators over the years have discussed the consequences of the 1965 war.

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength. (“Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies”, S.M. Burke)

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long. (Rasul Bux Rais)

Even today, despite the crazinesss, there are a couple of  examples where some media personalities have tried to put the record straight by pushing for the truth.  Let us check them out as well.

This first exchange between Ejaz Haider and a General of Pakistani Army shows how the latter is just not willing to accept the truth and tries to take the whole argument in a different direction that suits Pakistan’s twisted narrative.

Here is another example of a Brigadier who discusses why the whole war of 1965 was the result of bad intentions and foolish plans of the Pakistan Army – and most importantly of ZA Bhutto!

Here are two more videos that are worth watching.

The first one is of an interview of Retired Air Chief of Pakistan Asghar Ali.  He discusses the 1965 and other wars and he pleads that India is not a threat to Pakistan.

This video now is of Najam Sethi – who discusses the political reasoning behind the start of the 1965 war and its impact on Pakistani politics.  Also he discusses how the Pakistani people are lied to by the establishment on the outcome of the 1965 war.  It is worth listening to.

The truth is fairly clear, but most in our generation in India have also not been told the truth!

Concluding Remarks

India may not have won the war conclusively, which it should have had it not been for the traitorous role of many at the helm at that time.  But India shrugged off the hurt on the minds and hearts from the 1961 war loss to China with this war.  It helped it fine tune the war strategies and also plan its entire weapons system afresh.

In retrospect, 1965 prepared India for 1971 victory.

In the October 1965 Time’s issue, a Western Official was quoted saying: Now it’s apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

So, overall, despite all the odds of betrayal against the Indian victory, the 1965 war still served India’s overall interest well.  India could have used the sacrifices and valor of Indian Defense Officers better, but their efforts did not entirely go in vain.

In case of Pakistan however, the facade of falsehood still is strong and well.